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Abstract 
Complex technical systems go through a series of stages in their 
evolution from a concept of how to meet a possible challenge to an 
operational version responding to real-world crises. The present 
analysis offers a characterization of these stages and the factors that 
shape the transitions between them. It can be used to describe the 
status of a system, to characterize or antic~pate developmental 
difficulties, and to diagnose the sources of disagreements among those 
involved with it. It is illustrated here in the context of a specific 
system for which all stages must be addressed successfully, the 
National Command Authority for control of nuclear weapons in the U.S. 
or U.S.S.R. 
THE EVOLUTION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics face 
a variety of similar military problems. Both superpowers have vast 
nuclear arsenals, giant military establishments, global security 
interests, treaty commitments, and sophisticated technical systems for 
controlling military power. Both countries also have systems for 
ensuring civilian political control over the military. This system is 
known as a National Command Authority (NCA). Its goal is being in 
control of important military decision making, especially during crisis 
situations. The most dangerous crisis situations are ones threatening 
or actually involving a nuclear attack. Preventing or controlling such 
crises is, therefore, a major focus of both NCAs. 
Many writers have tried to describe these NCAs, with most of their 
writing aimed, primarily, at explaining how each is meant to work and, 
secondarily, at how it actually will work in crisis situations (Carter, 
1985; Hemsley, 1982; Young, 1982; Zraket, 1984). One common concern in 
these latter analyses is that the NCAs will not work well enough to 
ensure constant civilian control over military power (Blair, 1985; 
Bubrow, 1977; Bracken, 1983; Ford, 1985; Tucker, 1983). 
When potential inadequacies are identified, two responses are 
possible. One is to take the limitations as a fact of life and 
explicate their implications for the vulnerability of the country and 
for the stability of the international system that links it with other 
countries (e.g., can such failures lead to accidental war or to the 
unintended escalation of crises?). Alternatively, one can accept the 
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reality of current limitations, but not their inevitability. In this 
light, critical analysis of the present system is a stepping stone to 
proposals for improving and perfecting it. 
In either case, recognizing limitations means doubting, at least 
implicitly, the validity of strategic policies that assume the 
existence of more smoothly functioning systems. Whether those policies 
are so unrealistic that they should be abandoned entirely depends, in 
large part, upon what one believes the opportunities for change to be. 
If change is feasible, then the challenge becomes to keep the system 
from being tested before it can be perfected. If change is unlikely, 
then there is a need for strategic policies that acknowledge reliance 
on imperfect command-and-control systems. 
One obvious precondition for meaningful change is having an 
articulated plan for a better system, supported by a reasonable 
expectation of being able to remove the technical obstacles to making 
it operational (e.g., producing the electronic components, training the 
operators). However, change also requires generating the political 
support needed to mandate and finance an initiative, getting those 
responsible for the current system to accept change, and making che new 
system work in the hands (and minds) of the fallible humans who sit 
behind the command-and-control panels. 
A comprehensive assessment of the chances for change requires a 
comprehensive conception of the obstacles to it. we offer here such a 
conception. Appearing schematically in Figure 1, it describes the 
stages through which a command-and-control system evolves, at each 
stage looking at the social institutions responsible for a system's 
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evolution and the factors influencing their activities. As elaborated 
below, these stages take a system from the recognition that some 
response is needed to cope with an external threat, through the shaping 
influence of national ideologies, partisan politics, and interservice 
rivalries, and on to a real-life system as it attempts to respond to an 
immediate challenge. 
A wholely new system would be expected to traverse this path from 
the beginning, with the realities and pressures of each stage 
contributing to its eventual form. However, once a system is in place, 
pressure for additional change could come at any level, including 
changes in the external threat, new thinking on what constitutes the 
"perfect system," tinkering with the actual system, or improvisation 
when it is under stress. Having such an evolutionary model in mind 
can, we believe, help to produce a fuller description of existing 
systems, one which is sensitive to how they have fared in the 
evolutionary process, what developmental conflicts have yet to be 
resolved, and how close the actual system is to the intended one. 
Where this description (or life itself) shows the system to be 
unsatisfactory, such an analysis can suggest how to design a 
comprehensive strategy for introducing change and, by identifying 
obstacles, indicate the limits to change (and, hence, to system 
perfectability). 
For example, introducing a new concept from the top offers the 
best chance of coherent, integrated change. Yet, each stage between 
that concept and the eventual product can force the changes in unin-
tended directions or prevent any change at all. By contrast, 
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initiatives coming from people within the system should be better able 
to anticipate and overcome technical problems and human resistance. 
However, they are also more likely to disrupt any overall system 
"logic" which is only apparent from the top, while remaining captive of 
the ideologies and political compromises embodied in the current 
system. 
An evolutionary model can also help clarify what people are 
talking about when they discuss command-and-control systems. Do they 
mean the system that they would like to have, the system that is 
promised, the best system that is likely to be produced, or the system 
that currently exists? Each level calls for a different degree of 
specificity and a different degree of realism. Knowing the intended 
level is essential to having appropriate expectations and 
interpretations (Bracken, 1980; Everett, 1982; Pate-Cornell~ Neu, 
1985). 
There are perhaps several ways to describe the evolution of a 
system. Ours emphasizes the role of humans in it, whether as 
theoreticians, designers, supporters, critics, manufacturers, or 
operators. Certainly, the physical side of command-and-control systems 
is essential to their operation. They can do little without adequate 
telecommunications, remote sensing, ordnance, and so on. However, 
technology cannot do the job alone and may, indeed, complicate matters 
if its operators mistrust or misuse it (Cushman, 1983; Welch, 1982; 
Wohl, 1981). Gardenier (1976) coined the term "radar-assisted 
accidents" to describe the new class of mishaps that accompanied the 
introduction of radar to ships in inland waterways. Although radar 
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averted some accidents, it created others by disturbing established 
patterns for ship operation and communication. Relying on trial and 
error to reveal human factors problems is expensive at best and 
impossible for novel applications (which any real attack would be, to 
some extent). Nor can it deal with problems due to operators' 
confusion over their goals (or those of their opponents). Focusing on 
human factors should increase the chances of addressing these problems 
and avoid excessive attention to the tidier problems of technology 
(Sheridan, 1980). 
NCAs are unique in their mission and in their details. Yet, they 
are also special cases of what are currently being called distributed 
decision-making systems, that is, ones in which the information and re-
sponsibility for decision making are distributed over individuals who 
are typically (although not necessarily) physically separated (Athans, 
1982; Fischhoff & Johnson, in press; Tenney & Sandell, 1981). Such 
systems are common in both military and civilian arenas (e.g., 
mutinational corporations, diplomatic services, fast-food franchises, 
networks of self-help groups). To varying degrees, advances in 
telecommunications have given them new capabilities and exposed them to 
new stresses, which are perhaps felt with particular acuteness in 
military applications (Coulam & Fischer, 1985; Fischhoff, Lanir, & 
Johnson, 1986. Thus, although it focuses on the evolution of NCAs, 
the present analysis could be extended by analogy to any command-and-
control system, distributed decision-making system, or complex 
technological system influx. Johnson and Fischhoff (in preparation) 
narrow the focus to a comparative analysis of the US and USSR NCAs, 
5 
Whatever comparison is made, it is essential to know the level of 
description, in order to know the kind of reality to ascribe to it. 
The present analysis offers a general characterization of levels, 
applicable to any operational systems, but focused here on the two 
NCAs. 
As conceptualized in Figure 1, a system evolves through six stages 
from a perception of the external reality that needs to be managed, to 
a theoretically derived ideal of the perfect response system, to a 
notion of the best possible system given current technological and 
economic capabilities, to plans for the best feasible system given the 
resources actually allocated to it, to the operational system produced 
by investing those resources, to the system that is mobilized in 
response to an actual challenge. Each transition between stages 
introduces a somewhat different set of constraints and pressures. Each 
brings somewhat different individuals and institutions into prominence, 
as the result of having pertinent power or expertise. Each is bound by 
the outcome of preceding stages; for example, the best engineering and 
training can do little to overcome an overall concept that is based on 
a misreading of the enemy or which is distorted to meet political 
purposes. 
To some extent, performing well at any level requires an 
understanding of the realities at all other levels. For example, the 
theorists who develop the concept of a perfect system are primarily 
responsible for interpreting the external situation created by the 
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superpowers' capabilities and intentions in the light of the values 
expressed in sources like the US Constitution and latest Harris poll. 
However, they also need some idea of whether their country has the 
technology and personnel to implement the systems that they might 
propose. Conversely, the system's operators need some big picture if 
they are to interpret ambiguous situations and maintain their morale. 
One goal of designing an orderly evolutionary process for system 
development is to limit how much personnel at each level need to know 
about the others in order to perform their tasks. If the process 
worked perfectly, then people in it would only need an understanding of 
the adjacent levels; these in turn would be responsible for 
comprehending the levels immediately above and below them. Thus, 
strategic theorists would not need more than a vague idea of what it is 
like to be in a bunker or an airborne command post with a finger on the 
button. As long as each pair of levels was suitably linked, then these 
theorists' general intentions would be reliably transmitted downward 
and faithfully interpreted in the context of actual situations. 
Conversely, pertinent features of the reality below will be transmitted 
upward, so as to prevent the theorists from making unreasonable demands 
or harboring unrealistic expectations. 
An evolutionary process can fail if this transmission process goes 
awry, if those at any level fail to perform their tasks, if any level 
is omitted or short circuited, or if individuals whose expertise is 
appropriately exerted at one level attempt to influence other levels. 
Once the process begins to falter, then the problems at each stage 
cumulate to produce systems and policies that are not understood or 
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desired. A detailed look at the levels and transitions can serve as 
the basis for anticipating, preventing, and treating problems. After 
discussing the evolutionary process, we suggest some generic pitfalls 
and possible solutions. 
THE STAGES 
The Concept 
At its most abstract level, an NCA begins from recognition of a 
reality that must be managed. That reality has an external component, 
the threat posed by the other side's current and potential political-
military stances, and an internal component, one's own comparable 
stances. The resulting concept describes what needs to be done, 
bounded by some general awareness of how (and whether) it might be 
accomplished. Some of these goals and constraints may almost go 
without saying (e.g., ensuring maximum survivability of key leaders, 
along with an orderly transition in the event of casualities). Others, 
however, require reflection on a country's guiding values or prediction 
of what might reasonably be achieved. For example, the extreme time 
constraints of an actual attack might suggest centralizing command 
authority in the military, hoping that the responsible commanders will 
be sensitive to the opinions that civilian leaders would express were 
there time to consult them. However, the importance of civilian 
control over the military is so important to both countries that 
constant civilian involvement is incorporated in the basic concept of 
each's NCA, implicitly accepting a possible loss in efficiency. On the 
other hand, the same time constraints do not lead both countries to 
similar conclusions regarding the feasibility of having a flexible 
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response to the onset of an attack (Ball, 1983), The USSR's concept 
calls for restraining their forces until such point as all are 
released. By contrast, the US's concept calls for keeping its options 
open, allowing for varied responses to perceived USSR actions. 
Like other aspects of a basic concept, the positions of the USA 
and USSR on these two features (civilian control and flexibility) 
reflect a complex mixture of culture, law, social history, and national 
ideology (e.g., Huntington, 1964; Leebaert, 1981). For example, US 
insistence on flexibility may reflect, in varying parts, an accurate 
appraisal of superior US technological capability, another expression 
of American faith in technical solutions, a psychological inability to 
accept the prospect of things quickly getting out of control were a 
nuclear conflict to begin, the legacy of President Kennedy's desire for 
better real-time control of nuclear forces after the Cuban missile 
crisis, or continuation of the relative autonomy traditionally given to 
US field commanders to improvise the best solution consistent with 
general orders (thereby emphasizing initiative and self-reliance). For 
present purposes, however, the sources of this belief are less 
important than its consequences. Which systems does it promote and 
which does it discourage? Which features of the international system 
does it highlight and obscure? What reality does it create for the 
USSR in designing its own NCA? 
The Perfect System 
The concept provides an assemblage of goals and constraints 
indicating what an NCA should and should not be. The next stage in 
system evolution translates these statements of what to do (or not to 
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do) into a general description of how to do it. These proposals should 
be more constrained by current technical capabilities, without 
relinquishing the possibility of forcing the development of new 
technologies. It should also be more realistic about economic 
limitations, but without relinquishing the hope of increasing budgets 
by creating sufficiently persuasive plans. These limits on realism 
make it important to distinguish descriptions of this level from those 
for subsequent ones. 
The image of a perfect system might be seen in a briefing that 
showed how the US NCA is meant to operate, reaching down to how it 
should control naval task forces or unified and specified commands. It 
would show the consistency of the ideal with the American concept 
(e.g., Mearsheimer, 1983) of military autonomy within civilian guidance 
and periodic oversight, which implies a faith in the military to carry 
out its mission (as defined by civilian authorities). As a result, a 
design principle for perfect systems is minimizing civilian 
interference in routine military decisions, in the interests of 
effeciency. That means, in turn, delegating authority throughout the 
system, as well as the information needed to exercise that authority. 
Thus, the design for a perfect system would emphasize features such as 
how information and instructions flow, as well as checks for ensuring 
that it is, in fact, operating without constant supervision. However, 
the design must also allow for assertion of civilian control at any 
time that faith is lost, novel situations arise, or political 
conditions dictate. 
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The Soviet Union has quite a different history of civilian-
military relations. Since the founding of the Soviet state, the 
military has been viewed as the ultimate source of political power. As 
a consequence, strict control over the military is seen as essential to 
maintaining political power. In the Soviet perfect system, a General 
Staff controls day-to-day operations, whereas a Supreme High Command, 
chaired by the (civilian) General Secretary of the Communist party, in 
his role as Supreme Commander in Chief, controls all crisis situations 
(Scott & Scott, 1983). Although this arrangement would resemble the US 
perfect system in some respects, it would also have greater 
concentration of power (and less delegation of authority), so as to 
facilitate monitoring in routine situations. As a result, ensuring 
civilian control in crisis situations should require less transfer of 
power. 
An orderly transition to this stage from its predecessor means 
deriving general design guidelines from the very general principles 
embodied in the concept. Doing so may mean confronting uncomfortable 
conflicts between ostensibly inviolate principles. What happens, for 
example, when civilian control comes at the expense of survivability? 
If the system theorists (at this level) make these tradeoffs 
differently than would the social theorists (at the concept level), 
then the system will embody unresolved conflicts in its objectives. 
Executing the perfect-system stage explicitly increases the chances of 
recognizing and addressing such problems, insofar as it is hard to 
discern the design philosophies of systems at the later, more concrete 
levels. Having an explicit image of the perfect system also provides 
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clearer directives for those subsequent stages. 
The Best Possible System 
The next set of constraints is set by scientific, industrial, and 
economic base of the country building the system. It determines what 
could be done were those resources turned single-mindedly to this 
particular task. Although the system at this level is still an ab-
straction, it is now one requiring detailed design work, sensitive to 
the capabilities and limitations of the people and machines available 
to do the job. 
As before, both technical and social obstacles threaten adequate 
completion of this stage. The main technical threats are bad science, 
in the sense of applying current knowledge ineffectively, and bad 
science policy, in the sense of misestimating what knowledge can be 
developed and applied in the time allotted. The result might be either 
a bad plan or an impractical one. The main political threats are 
failing to generate the resources needed to realize the plan, or being 
forced to make compromises that disrupt its technical coherence or its 
fidelity to the concepts underlying the perfect system. In facing the 
conflicting pressures of faithfulness to that concept and promising 
adequate performance at a reasonable price, the system plan becomes the 
uncomfortable meeting ground for the conflict between national myths 
and objective constraints. 
Current American efforts to develop a defense against ballistic 
missiles provide a good example of a system in transition from perfect 
system to the best possible system. The Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) takes its inspiration from the perception that the situation 
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might arise in which the USSR would launch a ballistic missile attack 
against the US, against which no defense is currently available. The 
national value articulated by President Reagan as a response to this 
perception is that Americans respond to threats by using military 
technology to provide needed protection. One perfect system embodying 
this concept would be a shield protecting the entire United States with 
laser weapons and the like. As evidenced by its political success, 
this concept appears in harmony with popular ideology, culture, and 
history. SDI is now in the transition to a best-possible system, 
reflecting the limits of science, economics, and industrial capacity. 
During this phase, scientists and engineers are examining the limits of 
current (and hoped for) technologies to see what can actually be accom-
plished and what it will cost. The evolving system concept should 
offer the best possible configuration within reasonable (but 
optimistic) budgetary limits. 
The resulting proposals could fail politically if they were 
perceived as expressing a view of superpower relations that is 
inconsistent with currently accepted notions of detente and mutual 
coexistence. As of this writing, however, a more imminent threat is 
inability to make a plausible case for SDI's technical operability. 
That is, can we create the science to bring it off? A productive 
national debate would ask such questions, as well as how development of 
a perfect SDI system would influence international relations during its 
construction period and what would it mean were an imperfect system to 
be the ultimate result. 
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The Best Feasible System 
Before a system confronts the harsh reality of international 
affairs, the plans for it confront the harsh reality of national poli-
tics. To proceed, the plans must recruit the support of the political 
leaders (including legislators, publicists, etc.) who must appropriate 
the funds for its development, the scientsts and engineers who must 
create the knowledge needed for its operation, and the military figures 
who must ensure its adoption. Each of these groups may have different 
interpretations of national goals, against which to compare the 
evolving system concept. Each is likely to have its own vested 
interests. Thus, the plan will be scrutinized by elected officials for 
how voters would view support for the system, by the military for how 
it would affect service capabilities, missions, and interservice 
balances, by contractors for how production would affect their balance 
sheet, by special interest and citizen groups for how well it fits 
their goals. In American terms, the emerging best feasible system will 
be "what comes out of committee." 
To planners, these pressures may seem like needless complications, 
useful, at best, for getting the system's message "out to the broader 
public." There are, however, a number of constructive roles that such 
scrutiny can play. One is to check that the theoreticians and 
technical people have, in fact, produced a concept consistent with 
contemporary national values. A second is to cast a lay eye on the 
realism of the entire project. Non-technicians may have a relatively 
good feeling for how complex human systems actually work, as well as 
for the realism of the promises made by system proponents. A third 
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role is forcing the plan to defend itself against diverse critiques, 
each hungry for weaknesses that are inimical to its own best interests. 
A plan that weathers the attacks of the best technical experts that 
these interests can secure should be the better for it. 
Perhaps more of a risk than ignorance is lack of coherence in the 
pressures exerted at this level. If the political and technical 
critiques are unbalanced (e.g., due to the dominance of a particular 
vendor or armed service), then the design may be confused or distorted. 
It is easier for critics to prevent bad designs than to promote good 
ones. Their aggregate effect should depend, in part, on the health and 
balance of the overall political process (e.g., Coulam, 1977). 
The Actual System 
Once resources have been allocated, the technical specialists must 
make good their promises, producing an operational system within the 
given budgetary and conceptual constraints. Doing so requires real-
izing the potential solutions to technical problems, interpreting with 
greater specificity the tradeoffs implied by general societal values, 
and managing an ever-expanding cast of individuals having or wanting a 
piece of the action (including government bureaucrats, corporate 
executives, construction personnel, and potential operators). It 
requires addressing any incoherence introduced by the budgetary 
process' allocation of funds and assignment of responsibility. It 
requires maintaining a delicate balance in communications with the 
outside world, simultaneously assuring critics and supporters that the 
work is going well, while acknowledging enough problems to explain 
delays and justify requests for additional funds. This balancing act 
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may be particularly difficult when a project needs some hyperbole to 
get funded at all or where it requires unproven technology (which can 
only be explored once funds are allocated). The Divad and Roland air 
defense systems are two recent examples of projects where the actual 
system failed to fulfill promises made during the best-feasible stage 
(Easterbrook, 1982). Whether their development, nonetheless, 
represented reasonable gambles when undertaken is a question for 
retrospective technology assessment (Tarr, 1976). 
When a system stumbles, its proponents may have promised too much 
or they may have missed an attainable goal by mismanaging the 
construction and implementation stage. For example, unacceptable costs 
may reflect unrealistic initial estimates or uncontrolled defense 
contracting (e.g., profit pyramiding, cost-plus pricing). If the 
battle for adequate funding is lost, then the result may be purchasing 
only part of the system (threatening its coherence), purchasing fewer 
spare components than intended (threatening its reliability), or 
stretching out the development and production process (threatening the 
other systems and policies that depend on having an operational 
system). 
However developed their hardware, systems are but abstractions 
until they work with their actual operators behind the controls. 
Historically, "human factors" issues have been faced rather late in 
systems development, well after most fundamental design decisions have 
been made. The result is more pressure on the operators to adapt to 
the machines than vice versa. If they cannot adapt, then the system's 
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performance may be disappointing or unpredictable (Brewer & Bracken, 
1984). 
For a new system to work as intended, its operators must 
individually overcome any inappropriate habits and expectations 
acquired during their experience with other, older systems. 
Collectively, they must coordinate their perceptions into a "shared 
model" of the new system and its environment, in order to perform 
effectively and cooperatively. With a system of any complexity, 
perceptions will likely be different for those approaching it from 
different angles. For example, in a hierarchically organized system, 
those at the "top" are likely to have an encompassing view that is 
sparse regarding details, whereas those at the "bottom" are likely to 
have detailed local knowledge without a complete understanding of the 
overall problem. Although formal training may try to inculcate the 
designers' view of the system, the operators' own hands-on experience 
is likely to create a shared model of the system with a life of its 
own, creating unexpected problems and solutions. For example, the 
robustness of NORAD reportedly owes much to its operators' ingenuity in 
diagnosing the sources of minor malfunctions (U.S. Government, 1981). 
A significant part of any actual system is its command and reward 
structure. Any innovation must either accept the current command 
structure (e.g., regarding the autonomy of local commanders) or include 
a revision of that structure in its implementation plan. A system that 
had succeeded in all other respects could easily founder on 
institutional resistance in this regard. 
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The Mobilized System 
The final version of a system emerges when it is put to the test, 
which for an NCA would mean a national emergency. The mobilized system 
that emerges in response to such tests is but a special case of the 
actual system, whose crisis performance can be predicted somewhat from 
observation of normal operation and responses to simulated crises. 
However, the actual transition to crisis footing must remain as 
something of an unknown, with the degree of unpredictability depending 
on the uniqueness of the crisis. For repetitive "low-grade" crises, 
such as hijackings, false alarms, and minor military engagements, some 
learning from actual experience is possible. For the most extreme 
event, nuclear war, no wholely realistic training or testing is 
possible. 
Some unpredictability is also due to the incompletely understood 
physical effects accompanying this ultimate test. Although there is 
some theory regarding electromagnetic pulse, thermal pulse, shock 
waves, and other communications disturbances, their effect on NCAs is 
largely a matter of speculation (Ball, 1981). At least as speculative 
are predictions of how the system will "rewire" itself after physical 
destruction of units or links between them (Bracken, 1983; Tucker, 
1983). How it could rewire itself depends on physical circumstances 
and technological capabilities. How well any rewiring works will 
depend on how accurately operators can interpret totally unique 
patterns of information and communication. That is, can they figure 
out who is still out there and what they know? Finally, there are non-
cognitive psychological questions, regarding how operators will respond 
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emotionally to crisis situations, after doing their best to comprehend 
the facts about them. One trains and hopes for calm, analytic 
appraisals and responses, yet those can never be entirely assured. 
DISCUSSION 
Complications of the Scheme 
Figure 1 describes an idealized process for the development of a 
novel system. Clearly, life is often more complex. One set of 
complications comes from the existing system that the new one replaces. 
Unless replacement is complete and instantaneous, the two systems must 
be compatible to avoid chaos during the transition. That constrains 
how innovative the new technology can be. Ignoring these constraints 
risks clashes between the two generations of software and hardware, and 
between operators' muddled mental models of them (Cushman, 1983; Lewis, 
1983). 
Analogous problems arise when a system changes during the 
development and implementation process, juxtaposing different versions 
of the system. Such changes in design may follow from advances in 
technology (perhaps stimulated by the system itself), from changes in 
how the external world is perceived, or from resistance by the 
organization receiving the system. All of these pressures are likely 
contingencies with complex systems having wide ramifications and long 
lead times. Experience with the system, as a concept, plan, proposal, 
or reality, will produce further pressure for change, introducing 
feedback channels from each stage to those preceding it. 
Utilization of Scheme 
Used statically, a scheme such as that in Figure 1 would 
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characterize the stage that a particular system description is meant to 
capture. More dynamically, it would follow, or perhaps even predict, 
the evolutionary process, showing its origin and future, as well as how 
its reality deviates from its ideal. Either statically or dynamically, 
the scheme can contrast how individuals at different levels perceive 
the system. Each transition can cause perceptions to diverge, with 
each discrepancy between perceptions having different practical 
importance. For example, differences between perceptions at the top 
and bottom levels would show where operators need education about the 
overriding national mission they are meant to execute or where 
theoreticians need some education about how the real world works. When 
discrepancies emerge between adjacent stages, remedial steps more 
explicit than general education may be undertaken. For example, it is 
possible, in principle, to reform those aspects of the military 
procurement process that make the actual system differ from the best 
feasible one. Conversely, the design procedures leading to 
characterization of the best feasible system could, again in principle, 
be brought into line with the realities of maintaining technical 
expertise (and morale) at defense contractors, as well as with the 
extra costs and seeming inefficiencies that that concession to 
corporate realities entails. 
A scheme could like Figure 1 can also facilitate interpreting the 
meaning, at each level, of changes that occur in the system. Consider, 
for example, the recent redeployment of the National Emergency Airborne 
Command Post from Edwards Air Force Base to a location in the Midwest. 
As a belated and reluctant recognition of the impossibility of 
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evacuating the President in time of acute crisis, the move may mean 
relatively little for the actual operation of the US NCA. However, it 
would symbolically mean a great deal for the underlying perfect system, 
with its ideal of civilian control of the military. 
Choosing a Level of Description 
The purpose of a description should dictate its level. For 
example, the initial public debate over a system with implications for 
national policy debate should not focus on questions of technical 
feasibility. Where that happens, fundamental policy issues may get 
lost in a welter of technical details, increasing the risk of massive 
investment in systems that are incompatible with society's values. 
Conversely, allowing theoreticians to comment on a system's technical 
details threatens its operational viability, without much chance of 
achieving their social and political goals. 
The present evolutionary scheme is moot regarding the viability of 
specific command-and-control systems. Rather, it makes the global 
prediction that an orderly evolutionary process increases the chances 
of system success. From that follows the prescription that everything 
should be done to ensure that the various relevant parties fulfill 
their designated roles, according to the scheme. 
Where the process is out of balance, then an evolutionary descrip-
tion can help clarify what kind of system has been created. For 
example, knowing the limits to an NCA's operability may vitiate or 
validate some strategic doctrines, as can knowing that the system 
works, but in ways incompatible with the perfect system's intent. 
There are several points of leverage for bringing a system into line 
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with hopes and intentions. One might attempt to sharpen the 
perceptions of those participating in the development process, to 
refine the balance among competing groups, to refine the procedures 
used at each level, or to alter the evolutionary process (e.g., by 
creating feedback loops between the stages). Where flaws remain, the 
ability to diagnose them may allow planners to prepare for problems. 
For example, the interaction between the NCA's of the two superpowers 
might be stabilized by exchanging information about how to avoid 
situations likely to produce false positives. 
To be meaningful, the description of a command-and-control system 
must specify the intended level of system evolution. That allows one 
to distinguish realities from promises, to judge informants' competence 
to make pronouncements at that level, and to anticipate at least some 
miscommunication. A system is unlikely to function well, if those 
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